

*Prepared in CIA*

9 March 1957

## THE KASHMIR SITUATION



### Background

1. Both politically and militarily the Kashmir situation was more or less stabilized on 1 January 1949 when a UN-directed cease-fire went into effect and Indian and Pakistani troops were divided by a cease-fire line running irregularly through the western portion of the state.

2. Since 1949, both India and Pakistan have maintained regular and irregular military forces in those parts of Kashmir held by them, and through these forces have maintained law and order. At present, India has three infantry divisions and numerous service troops in Indian-held Kashmir while Pakistan has about 2,000 regular army personnel and 20 battalions totalling 20,000 men of state troops in Azad (or Pakistani-held) Kashmir.

3. Indian troops have had no serious difficulty in maintaining order among the normally docile inhabitants of the area they control. The government of Pakistan and its army, however, have a more difficult security problem since they must maintain order not only among [redacted]

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[redacted] tribal inhabitants of Azad Kashmir but also among the traditionally unruly tribes in the northwest frontier region

*Note. This paper was used as background by Gen. Caleel as a basis for discussion of the situation at the IAC meeting on 12 March 1957. The paper was not SECRET NOR FOR APPROVAL. It was distributed. (See IAC-M-280, 12 March 1957, item 4a)*

of Pakistan proper. It was these latter tribesmen, not the former, who supplied the main impetus for the tribal military push which nearly conquered the Kashmiri capital of Srinagar in 1947.

4. During the eight year history of the Kashmir problem, the prospect of another tribal incursion across the cease-fire line into the Vale of Kashmir has frequently arisen. On some occasions, this threat has been used by the Pakistani government in bargaining with India or the UN for an advantageous position. On various occasions, when tempers were running high, the Pakistani government has displayed an ability to hold its tribesmen in check. Nevertheless, both the rugged characteristics of the Azad Kashmiri terrain and the excitable nature of Pakistan's tribal inhabitants present the constant possibility that some impetuous group will take matters into its own hands and make an armed incursion across the cease-fire line, which neither the Pakistani government nor its military forces can prevent.

#### Current Situation

5. Several recent reports suggest the possibility that either the Pakistani government or unruly elements within that country, inspired by the use of a UN force in Egypt, are considering an armed entry into Indian-held Kashmir to create a situation in which the United Nations would have to intervene, presumably with troops acting as an international police force.

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6.

[REDACTED] reportedly believes there is a real possibility of Pakistani-inspired hostilities in Kashmir in the event that Pakistan is able to secure a favorable resolution in the UN General Assembly which India subsequently refuses to accept. Reports from Pakistan indicate that the government is likely to revise its present restriction against tribal incidents if a satisfactory settlement does not result from UN deliberations. General Akbar Khan, who was involved in the 1951 plot to overthrow the Pakistani government, reportedly has formed an organization made up of selected local leaders in every major community in Pakistan which will demand that the government give the tribesmen a free hand.

7. Both the Pakistani government and other groups within Pakistan may actively be considering means of forcing UN military action in Kashmir in order to break India's hold on the major portion of the state. However, it appears from the above and other reports that they do not seriously plan to do so until UN resources have been exhausted and it is obvious to all that the strongest measures of which the UN is capable are insufficient to move India to make concessions. At present, from the Pakistani viewpoint, the UN has made, and is making, progress.

8. Furthermore, Gunnar Jarring, Swedish member of the UN Security Council left the United States on 8 March as the special representative of the Council to discuss the Kashmir case

in India and Pakistan and to report back to the Council by 15 April. He is expected to arrive in the subcontinent on 12 March. During the month or so he is in South Asia, the Pakistani government presumably will exert its utmost efforts to prevent untoward incidents. Pakistani tribesmen can probably also foresee that they will not serve their cause best by invading Kashmir during Jarring's visit.

Future Prospects

9. Following Jarring's mission, most Pakistanis should be inclined to wait for his report before taking matters into their own hands. Should his report indicate failure to make any progress toward solution, there would probably be an outcry from many Pakistanis, and the possibility of an armed outbreak would increase at this time. On the other hand, if Jarring's report were followed quickly by reference of the Kashmir case to a special session of the General Assembly, the period of danger might be brief. If the General Assembly did not consider the case until fall, there would be a dangerous period of inaction during the summer months. However, since the General Assembly seems likely to favor Pakistan in any discussion of Kashmir and in any resolution it might pass, the Pakistani government would probably try to use this argument to prevent action by hotheads during the summer.

10. The greatest danger of Pakistani intervention would occur if a General Assembly resolution strongly calling on India

to come to terms or condemning India for its failure to hold a plebiscite were openly flouted by Prime Minister Nehru. Presumably at this time, UN Security Council action, the attempts of a special UN representative, suggestions for bilateral talks, and General Assembly efforts would all have failed to solve the case and a deadlock would be reached. India would have been held up to world censure, and the Pakistanis might feel they would be excused if they took desperate measures in Kashmir.

11. On the other hand, it is too early to predict that matters will ever reach this extreme state. Nehru is aware that world opinion is against him, and that he might risk an Indo-Pakistani war by refusing all General Assembly proposals. Such a war would end his hopes of successfully completing the Second Five Year Plan, on which the Congress Party's political future and India's stability rest. Nehru is also probably aware that he may risk destroying his international reputation by defying not only the great powers in the Security Council but all the little Afro-Asian and other nations in the General Assembly as well. By 1 April, when the Indian national elections are over, Nehru may therefore at least be willing seriously to discuss possible solutions other than a full-fledged plebiscite.